There is some evidence that disordered self-processing in autism spectrum disorders (ASD) is linked to the social impairments characteristic of the condition. To investigate whether bodily self-consciousness is altered in ASD as a result of multisensory processing differences, we tested responses to the full body illusion (FBI) and measured peripersonal space (PPS) in 22 adults with ASD and 29 neurotypical adults. In the FBI setup, participants wore a head mounted display showing a view of their 'virtual body' being stroked synchronously or asynchronously with respect to felt stroking on their back.
Introduction
identification with one's entire body and self-location -have not been researched in autism. To date, only three studies have investigated body ownership in ASD (in relation to body parts), using the RHI (Cascio, Foss-Feig, Burnette, Heacock, & Cosby, 2012; Paton, Hohwy, & Enticott, 2012 ) and the 'numbness illusion' (Guerra, Spoto, Parma, Straulino, & Castiello, 2017) . Cascio and colleagues (2012) found that children with ASD required a much longer stroking duration for the illusion to establish, whilst Paton and colleagues (2012) found that the ASD group displayed reduced proprioceptive drift towards the rubber hand. The FBI, an illusion that manipulates body ownership (selfidentification) and self-location, is arguably a more effective and conceptually appropriate way of investigating the bodily self than the RHI -in which ownership of a single body part is altered -since one identifies one's self with Autism (in press) 6 one's whole body, rather than with a body part (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009 ). Yet the FBI has not been investigated in ASD.
PPS has also not been tested in people with ASD before, although it has been suggested, based on the RHI studies, that the PPS of individuals with ASD may be sharper and smaller than in the typical population (Noel, Cascio, Wallace, & Park, 2017) . This might manifest as a steeper gradient from self to other: a reduced distance over which multisensory stimuli approaching PPS are integrated, reflecting less flexibility in the PPS when interacting with the external world . This is in line with reports of individuals with ASD having difficulty respecting the personal space of others (Kennedy & Adolphs, 2014) and as more likely to approach other individuals too closely (Asada et al., 2016; Parsons, Mitchell, & Leonard, 2004) . It may also be inferred from these behaviours that the size of their PPS is smaller than in typical individuals.
To summarize, we investigated, for the first time, multisensory bodily self -consciousness in individuals with ASD using the FBI and a PPS measurement.
We expected to find evidence of altered bodily self-consciousness in individuals with ASD, manifesting as a reduced susceptibility to the FBI, and a smaller PPS with steeper gradient. We also expected there would be a positive relationship between empathy and susceptibility to the FBI, supporting previous suggestions that the representation of the bodily self contributes to social functioning.
Methods

Participants
Twenty-two participants with ASD and 29 participants without ASD, making a total of 51 participants (30 male), were recruited (mean age 27.1, age range 18-Autism (in press) 7 53). Forty-seven participants completed all parts and four (neurotypical) participants completed the PPS task only. The 22 ASD participants (14 male, 8 female) had a formal diagnosis of ASD given by an independent clinician. To confirm diagnosis, 19 of these participants attended an Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule diagnostic interview (ADOS - Lord et al., 2000) with one of the authors (SS), and four met the threshold point for an autism spectrum diagnosis, while 15 met the threshold for autism. The three participants who were not able to attend the ADOS interview scored well above the ASD cut-off 
Materials and Procedure
(i) Questionnaires
All participants completed the Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) , the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) ,, the Questionnaire of Affective and Cognitive Empathy (Reniers, Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, & Völlm, 2011) , and the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA - Mehling et al., 2012) measuring awareness of internal bodily sensations. The MAIA has 8 subscales that cannot be combined. We were primarily interested in Autism (in press) 8 the subscale 'Noticing', which measures awareness of comfortable, uncomfortable and neutral body sensations, and the subscale 'Attention Regulation', which measures the ability to sustain and control attention to body sensations when they are competing with exteroceptive signals, and so focus on these in the analyses.
(ii) Full Body Illusion Participants wore an Oculus Rift CV1 VR head mounted display (HMD) and were positioned 2.3m in front of a video camera in the body condition. In the object condition, participants stood 1.0m to the side of a tall cardboard box with a height and width similar to a person's body. The box was positioned 2.3m in front of the camera, such that the participant was out of view. The HMD displayed the body of the participant from the back in the body conditions, or the box in the object conditions (see Figure 1 ).
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Figure 1. FBI set-up for the body condition (A) and the object condition (B).
A custom-made program in Unity software was used to control the timing of the visual feed to the HMD. Four conditions were presented in random order: body synchronous, body asynchronous, object synchronous and object asynchronous. In the asynchronous conditions, the visual feed was delayed by 400ms, while there was no discernible delay (<50ms) in the synchronous condition). In the body conditions, the experimenter stroked the back of the participant for two minutes with a stick. In the object conditions, the experimenter stroked the back of the participant and the box simultaneously in a spatially congruent manner for two minutes, using two sticks. The experimenter was out of view in all conditions. After each condition, participants were asked to close their eyes, and the HMD was removed. They were guided backwards by a distance of 1.5m in very small steps, and then asked to return to their original position in normal steps, while keeping their eyes closed. The drift in selflocation was measured as the distance in centimetres between the original and estimated position. The FBI questionnaire (Lenggenhager et al., 2007) was administered after each condition. It contained seven statements (see Table 1) with which participants could agree/disagree on a seven point Likert scale from ---to +++. The midpoint was assigned zero. The order of the items was randomised. (iii) Peripersonal space
Peripersonal space was measured prior to the FBI experiment -using an audiotactile integration task (Canzoneri, Magosso, & Serino, 2012) . A custom built small tapper attached to the right middle finger was used to administer a small tap (the drop of a 4mm magnet). Participants were seated and blindfolded and responded as fast as possible to the tap by pressing a button with their left hand. Participants were told to ignore a sound (a pink noise) present in each trial. This sound was emitted from loudspeakers, one next to the participant's right hand and one 1 m further away. Modulation of the sound's volume resulted in the impression of the sound moving towards them (Maister et al., 2015) . Taps were administered at 300ms, 800ms, 1500ms, 2200ms and 2500ms after sound onset. Arduino board and LabView 8 (National Instruments, Austin, TX) software were used to control the sound, onset delay of the tap and record reaction times (RTs). There were 65 randomised trials in total, 10 for each onset delay, and 15 no-tap catch trials.
Results
(i) Empathy, Alexithymia and Interoception Questionnaires
Non-ASD and ASD participants scored significantly differently on the questionnaires that measured autistic traits (AQ), empathy (QCAE), cognitive empathy (QCAEcog), alexithymia (TAS20) and the MAIA subscale of attention Autism (in press) 12 regulation. No differences between groups were observed for affective empathy (QCAEaff) nor the other MAIA subscales (see Table 2 ). To further explore the data we examined differences in ratings for the 'self-identification' question, Q3 ('It felt as if the body/object was my body').
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests were planned per group for Q3, comparing the synchronous vs asynchronous for the body and object. The alpha-level was Bonferroni corrected to .012. 
(iv) Peripersonal Space
Participants' RTs were recorded per tapping delay after sound onset. Trials that were faster or slower than 2.5 SD of their average RT for that onset delay were removed (fewer than 5% of all trials). The data of two non-ASD participants was rejected due to equipment malfunction.
A 2 x 5 mixed ANOVA, with ASD status (ASD vs non-ASD participants) as the between subjects factor, and Tap Delay after sound onset as the within subjects factor (300ms, 800ms, 1500ms, 2200ms, 2500ms) was run. Results revealed a significant main effect of Tap Delay, F (4, 47) = 25.51, p < .001, η 2 p = .35 and a significant main effect of ASD status: ASD participants tended to have slower RTs than non-ASD participants, F (4, 47) = 7.11, p = .01, η 2 p = .13 and RTs tended to become faster with each consecutive delay (see Table 3 ). Importantly, a significant interaction ASD status x Tap Delay was found, F (4, 47) = 3.47, p = .04, between RTs at 2200ms and 2500ms, t (21) = 1.14, p = .27. For non-ASD participants, RTs at 800ms were significantly faster than RTs at 300ms, t (26) = 3.16, p = .004, but there was no significant difference between RTs at 800ms and 1500ms, t (26) = 1.61, p = .12, between RTs at 1500 and 2200ms, t (26) = 0.82, p = .42, and between RTs at 2200ms and 2500ms, t (26) = 2.66, p = .01. This means that in the two groups, tactile processing is differently boosted by co-occurring sounds, with a facilitation effect of sound on RTs occurring between 800 and 1500ms for ASD participants, whereas for non-ASD participants the facilitation occurred between 300 and 800ms. In this way, if we take the critical distance where the sound speeds up tactile RTs as a proxy of the PPS boundary (Canzoneri et al., 2012; Teneggi et al., 2013) , we can conclude that the PPS size of ASD participants is smaller. 
Tap Delay 300ms
Non-ASD 1109 (107) 1070 (104) 1043 (80) 1037 (74) 1017 ( [Insert Figure 5] 
(v) Correlations
Relationships between illusion strength in the body conditions, drift in selflocation, PPS slope and questionnaire measures of interoceptive awareness, autistic traits, empathy and alexithymia were investigated with Spearman correlations for the full sample of participants. Illusion strength -calculated as the subtracted score (synch-asynch) for Q3 (self-identification) in the body condition -showed a significant negative correlation with severity of autistic traits and a significant positive correlation with empathy ratings. No other correlations were significant (see Table 4 ). Table 5 for the regression coefficients. 
Discussion
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In the present study we investigated bodily self-consciousness in ASD by measuring responses to the full body illusion and the extent of PPS in participants with the condition. Overall our results show that individuals with ASD are much less susceptible to the FBI than are typical control participants.
Consistent with this, our data also show that the PPS of ASD participants is smaller and shows a steeper gradient at its boundary, indicating a more pronounced self-other distinction in ASD. The representation of the bodily self therefore seems to be less malleable in ASD participants and these 'low-level' differences in self may relate to (and partly underlie) the ability to empathise with others.
The FBI data show that agreement with illusion statements was signfiicantly higher in synchronous than asynchronous body conditions in the non-ASD group -as found previously (Aspell et al., 2012; Cowie, McKenna, Bremner, & Aspell, 2017; Ionta et al., 2011; Lenggenhager et al., 2007 ) -but did not differ in the ASD group. Moreover, neurotypical participants showed significantly greater self-identification with the virtual body in the synchronous condition and a greater self-location drift towards the virtual body during the synchronous condition, but this was not found for ASD participants. In keeping with this we found a strong and highly significant negative correlation of autistic traits with self-identification ratings.
Surprisingly, non-ASD participants also responded with higher ratings after synchronous stroking on the summated illusion questionnaire items and on the self-identification item Q3, in the object condition. However, the actual score of these participants in the object condition on Q3 indicated negative agreement with the statement (lower than 4 which equates to the neutral point), and only in Autism (in press) 22 the body condition did they positively agree with the Q3 self-identification statement. Similarly, ASD participants showed higher scores in the synchronous condition than the asynchronous condition for the summated illusion scores. But their score on Q3 in the synchronous object condition was also below 4, and therefore a negative agreement. In summary, only non-ASD participants identified more with the virtual body after synchronous stroking, while neither group identified with the object. This suggests that, whereas non-ASD participants have a tendency to self-identify with the virtual body and localise their self closer to it following synchronous stimulation, ASD participants do not appear to have a bodily self representation that adapts to changes in multisensory input so readily. This is in line with the finding that ASD participants show a lower susceptibility to the RHI (Cascio et al., 2012; Paton et al., 2012) , and suggests that ASD participants have an altered bodily self representation that encompasses their whole body.
Confirming our other hypotheses, and in line with recent predictions about the slope of PPS in ASD , the results of the PPS task demonstrated that ASD participants exhibited a steeper slope in their RTs as a function of the temporal delay of the tap, as the sound approached their body.
Also, their PPS boundary was closer to the body than for non-ASD participants. A smaller PPS may partly underlie certain behaviours sometimes seen in individuals with ASD, such as approaching others closer than social norms prescribe, or having difficulty considering communications outside personal space as directed towards themselves (Asada et al., 2016; Kennedy & Adolphs, 2014; Parsons et al., 2004) .
The reduced susceptibility to the FBI we found for ASD participants fits with the steeper PPS slope of these participants and may indicate a generally less flexible representation of the bodily self. The slope of the PPS indicates the distance over which the facilitatory effect on RT via the integration of touch and sound manifests: it occurs over a greater distance in a shallow slope than it does in a steep slope (found for ASD participants). Therefore conceptually, the slope of the PPS may indicate the flexibility of the boundary between one's self and an other . It has been shown that PPS extends towards others in social interactions (Teneggi et al., 2013) and that others' PPS can even sometimes be remapped onto one's own (Maister et al., 2015) . Having a steeper, less flexible boundary between self and other would mean that the PPS boundary of individuals with ASD would not change to the same extent in social interactions or during shared sensory experiences.
A limitation of the study however is that our results refer to the "perihand" PPS, and not to the "full body" PPS that can be measured by stimulating the trunk . Therefore our conclusions about the PPS modulation in ASD participants only relate to the peri-hand portion of the space around the body. A recent paper by Serino et al. (2015) , showed that the PPS size changes according to the body part around which the PPS is measured (i.e. face or hand or trunk), with the hand-PPS being the smallest, the face-PPS being larger and the trunk-PPS the largest. This is thought to reflect the different portions of space in which a body part mostly interacts with external objects:
whereas the hand interacts with objects in a very limited area, i.e. only when the hand is touching an object, the trunk is usually involved in interactions that occur over a larger area. Despite the different sizes of the body-part centered PPSs, we expect the full-body PPS in ASD participants to be modulated as the peri-hand one, i.e. being smaller in ASD than in non-ASD participants. This is because the sizes of different body-part PPSs are not fully independent of each other , and is in line with our interpretation and previous studies, that the smaller PPS in ASD participants may reflect their often-observed anomalous social interactions -such as 'invading' others' personal space -where the whole body as well as the hands are similarly involved (Asada et al., 2016; Kennedy & Adolphs, 2014; Parsons et al., 2004 ).
An explanation for the reduced susceptibility to the FBI in ASD is offered by findings that individuals with ASD have a wider temporal binding window (TBW) in which temporally close sensory signals are "bound" into a single perceived event (Greenfield, Ropar, Smith, Carey, & Newport, 2015; Kwakye, Foss-Feig, Cascio, Stone, & Wallace, 2011; Noel, Stevenson, & Wallace, 2018; Stevenson et al., 2014) . A wider TBW would impair the ability to integrate multisensory information and may lead to a lower ability to discriminate between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions of body illusions. This explanation is supported by our findings that on all measures, the difference between the synchronous and asynchronous condition was smaller for ASD participants.
Additionally, it has been suggested -following the finding of an inverse relationship between interoceptive sensitivity and susceptibility to the RHI (Tsakiris et al. 2011) -that an individual's bodily self is more robust and stable if interoceptive cues are more accurately/precisely represented relative to exteroceptive stimuli, making them less susceptible to body illusions (Palmer & Tsakiris, 2018; Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2014; Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jimenez, & Autism (in press) 25 Costantini, 2011). In a predictive coding approach, Palmer and Tsakiris (2018) propose that However, in the present study we did not find relationships between susceptibility to the FBI and interoceptive awareness. Furthermore, autistic individuals tend to have lower interoceptive sensitivity and awareness than the typical population (DuBois, Ameis, Lai, Casanova, & Desarkar, 2016; Mul, Stagg, Herbelin, & Aspell, 2018; Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016 ), yet our findings are in line with previous research that shows that they are less susceptible to body illusions, not more (Cascio et al., 2012; Guerra et al., 2017; Paton et al., 2012) . It is worth noting that an exceptionally wide temporal binding window for interoceptive and exteroceptive (cardio-visual) signals has been shown in ASD.
This may affect the balance of interoceptive and exteroceptive processing in terms of saliency and integration (Noel, Lytle, Cascio, & Wallace, 2018 Taken together, these findings support suggestions that the saliency of interoceptive vs exteroceptive prediction errors may differ in ASD , and/or that the strength of top-down predictions (priors) versus the saliency of bottom-up sensory prediction errors is different, as proposed by the so-called hypo-prior model of autism (Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012) . Usually, the experience of the full body illusion results from an optimal top-down resolution (update) to the prediction errors the multisensory conflict of the illusion generates. However, it has been proposed that in ASD bottom-up sensory signals outweigh top-down priors: an inflexibility in adapting higher order cognitions to novel sensory signals results (Lawson et al., 2014; Lawson, Mathys, & Rees, 2017) . This might explain both a less flexible sense of bodily self as evidenced by a reduced susceptibility to the FBI, and a reduced flexibility in self-other boundaries as suggested by our finding of a steeper slope of the PPS boundary.
It is worth noting that these findings are in line with suggestions that a low-level mechanism that differentiates between representations of self and other may be anomalous in ASD (Lamm, Bukowski & Silani, 2016; Lombardo et al., 2010; Sowden & Shah, 2014) . In particular, it is widely agreed that successful social interactions are reliant on the ability to flexibly switch between neural representations of self and others. This mechanism, referred to as "self-other control" (Decety & Sommerville, 2003) , has been hypothesised to be altered in ASD participants (Cook & Bird, 2012) . Importantly, several studies have tried to Autism (in press) 27 identify the neural basis of this "self-other control" mechanism, reaching a widely agreed conclusion that the two main areas involved are the medial prefrontal cortex and the temporoparietal junction (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009 ). These regions are critical in mentalizing, theory of mind and perspective taking, i.e. in those processes for which a flexible yet well-controlled distinction between self and others is needed. We therefore speculate -given the purely behavioural nature of our investigation -that a dysfunction in these key regions for controlling self-other distinction underpins the observed reduced malleability of bodily selfrepresentations in ASD participants (Lombardo et al., 2010; Uddin, 2011) .
Our final hypothesis, that altered bodily self-consciousness would be related to social functioning in ASD is supported by our findings. The strength of the experienced illusion as indicated by the self-identification question (Q3) was negatively related to autistic traits and positively related to empathy. Our multiple regression showed that both autistic traits and the tendency to selfidentify with the vitual body contributed significantly to empathy scores. This link with empathy suggests that altered bodily self-consciousness has social implications. Empathy involves the understanding and sharing of the emotion of an other, a process in which one's own emotional experience and that observed in an other are both neurally represented (Bird & Viding, 2014; Decety & Jackson, 2006; Sowden & Shah, 2014) . We can speculate that the reduced flexibility of bodily self-representation in ASD may hamper the ability to represent another flexibly as well. Indeed, the social environment provides more unpredictable and novel situations than any other, and it has been suggested that consequences of altered predictive coding in the brain are not restricted to Autism (in press) 28 perception, but also affect aspects of behaviour and social interaction (Balsters et al., 2016; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Lawson et al., 2014; Palmer, Lawson, & Hohwy, 2017) .
However, it was somewhat surprising to find that, in our sample, while autistic traits and the tendency to self-identify with the virtual body did contribute to empathy, alexithymia did not contribute significantly to empathy in our multiple regression model, which is in contrast to previous results (e.g. Bird, et al., 2010; Mul et al., 2018; Shah et al., 2016) . This may be due to differences in the way empathy was measured, i.e. state empathy for pain specifically in response to visual stimuli vs trait empathy by questionnaire. Alternatively, or additionally, our sample may not have been large enough to find a relationship.
Mul and colleagues (2018) and Aaron and colleagues (2015) did find a relationship between empathy and alexithymia, which was partly independent from the relationship with autistic traits, all of which were measured by questionnaire, the latter in a sample of 139 non-ASD adults.
We note a number of limitations of the present study. The use of selfreport measures of emotion understanding, although widely used, may produce unreliable (underestimated or overestimated) responses from some ASD participants. In this vein, it would be useful if future studies use an additional implicit measure of susceptibility to the FBI, such as changes in skin temperature (Salomon, Lim, Pfeiffer, Gassert & Blanke, 2013) , skin conductance response to threat to the virtual body (Ehrsson et al., 2008) or crossmodal congruency effects (Aspell, Lenggenhager & Blanke, 2009) . The relatively small size of our sample, and the fact that our non-ASD group did not have similar levels of alexithymia as the ASD group, means that our study is limited in regard to conclusions that can be drawn on the contributions of alexithymia and autistic traits to empathy.
In conclusion, our findings suggest that individuals with ASD have altered bodily self-consciousness, likely due to differences in multisensory integration, which may have a cascading effect on social functioning. Participants with ASD showed reduced susceptibility to the FBI and had a smaller PPS with a steeper slope than control participants. These results might be explained by wider temporal binding windows in ASD and/or a hypo-prior predictive coding account of autism, and may be compounded by impairments in mechanisms underlying "self-other control" (Decety & Sommerville, 2003) in autism.
We suggest that the observed differences may be indicative of a less flexible representation of the bodily self in ASD. The integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive signals and the contribution of these integrated signals to bodily self-consciousness may also differ in ASD, and this warrants further investigation. Lastly, further research into if and how an altered bodily self affects higher order self-processing would also be informative, as this would not only increase our understanding of autism and other disorders of self, but also deepen our insight into the nature of self.
